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The United States of America: Counter-Terrorism Pre-9/11  
Aaron Winter  
Since the attacks of 9/11, political, public, media and academic focus on terrorism and counter-terrorism has 
proliferated. According to Martha Crenshaw, ‘[t]he attacks of September 11 propelled terrorism from obscurity 
to prominence in the wider field of international relations and foreign and security policy’, adding that 
‘[s]cholars who had previously ignored terrorism now acknowledged it as a major national security concern’.1 
According to Andrew Silke, prior to 9/11, the study of terrorism was peripheral in academia, but ‘[s]ince the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, interest in – and funding for – terrorism related research has increased enormously’.2 
Yet, he argues that there has been an over-emphasis on al Qaeda and a lack of historical research.3 In fact, when 
9/11 occurred it became difficult for many to remember a time when it was someone other than a Muslim 
perpetrator. In addition to this, much literature, media attention and counter-terrorism since 9/11 has focused on 
international terrorism and foreign actors, sources and threats, as opposed to domestic ones. 9/11 not only served 
to determine the terms of terrorism and counter-terrorism, but also overwrote, if not erased, the collective and 
institutional memory of pre-9/11 terrorism. According to Robert Singh, 9/11 ‘… heralded a dangerous and 
unprecedented chapter in the ‘American experiment’. 9/11 represented the end of what remained of America’s 
post-1991 innocence about the severity of global threats’.4  Former Director of the CIA R. James Woolsey, 
argued that ‘[i]f the world did not change on September 11, 2001, at least most people’s perception of it did’.5  
 
In Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda, Christopher Hewitt shows that this is not 
the first time that this has occurred. Describing the shock and surprise the media expressed following 9/11, as if 
it were without precedent in America, he cites Newsweek’s response to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh on April 19 1995, previously the largest attack on 
American soil, having killed 168 and injured approximately 680: ‘This doesn’t happen here …. It looked like 
Beirut. But the devastated building was deep in America’s heartland, ending forever the illusion that here at 
home we are safe’.6 He also cites Newsweek’s response to the first World Trade Center (WTC) attack by Ramzi 
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Yousef on 26 February 1993 (prior to Oklahoma and also within the period of ‘innocence’), which ‘rattled the 
country’s confidence, dispelling the snug illusion that Americans were immune, somehow, to the plague of 
terrorism ….’.7 Hewitt attributes this to historical ignorance, the ideological diversity of the terrorists, and their 
fragmented organizational forms.8 
 
The tension, if not contradiction, between overdetermined representations of individual events and selective 
memory, historical amnesia or even ignorance, is not restricted to the media. The first World Trade Center 
attack had enough of an impact to associate the location with terrorism and lead then New York Mayor Rudy 
Giuliani to approve placing the Office of Emergency Management headquarters there, not considering the 
impact if it were to be targeted again. The first attack was remembered post-9/11 because of this dangerous 
mistake and the failure to recognize or act on the threat posed by al Qaeda to both the WTC and America itself.  
Yet, the link also served to emphasize the role of al Qaeda and threat of international/foreign terrorism and 
forget the Oklahoma City bombing and the longer history of terrorism involving domestic anti-government 
activists, such as Timothy McVeigh, and white supremacists such as the Ku Klux Klan, both of which have 
experienced a revival and renewed attention following Obama’s and Trump’s elections. In 2009, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, formed in the wake of 9/11, issued the report Rightwing Extremism: Current 
Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment. The report warned of a 
resurgence in right-wing extremism and potential for violence in the context of Obama’s election and the 
economic downturn, similar to that seen with the anti-government militia movement and Oklahoma City 
bombing in the 1990s.9 Thus, not only challenging the view that all terrorism is Islamic and international, but 
also using historical examples and lessons learned from previous periods, such as not only the bombing, but 
warnings from the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and others of the threat posed by anti-government 
militias threat prior to it. 
 
As counter-terrorism is, by its very nature, a response to current, ongoing or future predicted threats, it must 
adapt to respond to new forms of terrorism and the changing nature of threats. These change based on the 
emergence of new movements and groups, ideologies, strategies and tactics in different contexts, as well as 
changes to terrorist strategies and tactics in response to new counter-terrorism measures themselves. Thus, while 
a focus on past manifestations, experiences and frameworks may be ill suited to the demands of counter-
terrorism, one that focuses only on current threats risks presentism and missing the longer-term lessons of 
history. A historical examination of terrorism and counter-terrorism, such as this chapter presents, can help map 
and analyze changes, patterns, mistakes and failures over time (e.g. Giuliani’s decision and the government’s 
failure to address warnings about anti-government Militias pre-Oklahoma City and al Qaeda pre-9/11). This can 
help to address not only the lack of historical knowledge that Silke and Hewitt note, but highlight the problems 
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of and challenge contextually specific, reactive, presentist and ahistorical approaches, as well as politically or 
ideologically motivated counter-terrorism policy, and assumptions or stereotypes, often racialized, about the 
profile of the ‘terrorist’ and creation of ‘suspect communities’, such as that experienced by Muslims post-9/11.  
This chapter examines the history of counter-terrorism and the terrorism and terrorist threats to which it 
responded in the United States pre-9/11. Part one will provide an overview of the different types of domestic 
and international terrorism and movements that have affected or targeted America historically and been the 
focus of counter-terrorism. Part two will examine the history of counter-terrorism in the United States, looking 
at different developments, policies and approaches, and examine the ways in which counter-terrorism has 
changed in response to both threats and attacks, political and ideological agendas and interests, pressure and 
criticism, as well as challenges, mistakes and failures.  
Terrorism Pre-9/11 
It is not only that knowledge and understanding of terrorism in or involving America in the pre-9/11 era is 
challenged by a collective amnesia or a reading of terrorism largely determined by 9/11, but there is a lack of 
consensus amongst experts when terrorism began and what or who may be included in a history of terrorism. 
This may, as we will explore later, be a product of how the state, security and law enforcement define and deal 
with threats based on factors such as political pressure, interests or expediency, high profile events, the changing 
nature, character or source of threats, the scope and remit of existing laws, and jurisdictional issues, as well as a 
lack of consensus on the definition. The U.S. Cabinet Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, which was 
established in 1985, stated that ‘terrorism is a phenomenon that is easier to describe than define’.10 The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) did not formalize their definition of terrorism until 1986 as ‘the unlawful use of 
force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or 
any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives’, and there was no requirement that local law 
enforcement accept and abide by this definition.11 It was only in 2001 that the State Department came up with 
its definition: ‘the term “terrorism” means premediated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience’ 
(U.S. Code title 22, section 2656f(d)).12 
It is important to note that for a variety of reasons, historically not all terrorism has been dealt with through 
counter-terrorism policy and legislation, some has been dealt with through criminal law, and not all threats or 
attacks that are dealt with by counter-terrorism, are on the face of it, terrorism. Some may be cases of vandalism, 
robbery or harassment that are committed by groups designated as terrorist, based on labelling, their political 
intentions or wider repertoire of tactics. While other cases may be ones in which the state sees counter-terrorism 
policy and legislation as the most effective or expedient way to deal with of the actions of an individual or 
political group because it allows them to increase resources or legal powers.   
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Terrorism and terrorist groups that are covered by American counter-terrorism can be divided into two types 
based on the perpetrator and target: domestic and international. In the 1980s, the FBI made the distinction 
between domestic terrorism perpetrated by ‘a group or individual based and entirely operating within the United 
States or its territories without foreign direction’ and international terrorism acts are those that ‘occur outside the 
United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the 
persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek 
asylum’.13 The CIA, with international jurisdiction, defined international terrorism as ‘terrorism conducted with 
the support of foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or 
governments’.14 Terrorism in and against the United States has come from both left and right-wing movements, 
has operated based on a variety of causes and identities, often overlapping, including racial-ethnic, religious, 
nationalist, separatist, revolutionary and single issue, and has been anti-state and oppositional, as well as state-
sponsored and state or system-supportive.  
While the focus on much discussion and strategy post-9/11, has been international and ‘Islamist’ terrorism, most 
literature on American counter-terrorism, places the origins of terrorism in and involving America with 
domestic terrorism in the 1950s and 1960s, and the perpetrators and period that played a role in the emergence 
of federal counter-terrorism. Most notably the 3rd era Ku Klux Klan in the 1950s and 1960s and New or 
Revolutionary Left of the late 1960s and early 1970s. While there are some examples from earlier, such as the 
post-Civil War 1st era Ku Klux Klan who opposed Black emancipation and reconstruction in the 1860s and early 
1870s, the Molly Maguires, who targeted anti-Irish Catholic Scots, Ulster, Welsh and English Protestants in the 
1870s,15 and anarchists such as Leon Czolgosz who killed President William McKinley in 1901, leading to the 
formation of the Secret Service protection detail, what is often left out of the story is the role of terrorism against 
the British in the American Revolution. Yet, as terrorism is largely identified and understood through its 
labelling and response by counter-terrorism and other state measures, it would be difficult to expect an 
American response to terrorism that occurred in its name, before it existed as a sovereign country. Yet, it is 
important to acknowledge because it was the first example, part of America’s celebrated founding mythology, 
and provided a source, influence and reference in future extreme-right terrorism, including the Minutemen of the 
1960s, Patriots of the 1980s, Militias of the 1990s, and the Oklahoma City bombing itself which took place on 
the 220th anniversary of the Battle of Lexington, the first of the American Revolution.16 Moreover, it can be used 
to shine a light on the selective and at times hypocritical application of the term to delegitimize, demonize or 
hold to collective account certain social groups or political movements, but not others.    
Because of issues defining terrorism, such as the lack of a single shared definition, the reluctance of law 
enforcement agencies to label acts where there is no individual or group claiming responsibility as ‘terrorism’, 
complex jurisdictional issues (which also impact record keeping), as well as wider problems with official 
statistics, data on terrorism in American history must be treated with critical caution. Hewitt attempted to 
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address these challenges and traced the history of domestic and foreign terrorism in America from the 1950s to 
9/11. While the FBI makes a clear distinction between domestic and international terrorism, in which foreign 
operatives occupy the latter category, for Hewitt domestic terrorism, which is defined as terrorism in America, 
includes attacks within America by international operatives. They are placed under the ‘foreign’ sub-category of 
‘domestic’ along with émigrés (e.g. Cuban) and Puerto Rican independence groups due to the fact that central to 
the modus operandi of the latter is the rejection of American possession of the territory and thus their 
designation as ‘American’.17 Al Qaeda would be an example of a group that would straddle both domestic 
(under foreign) and international, because they represent an international perpetrator and domestic targets, but 
more generally they would be placed in the international category due to their non-American origins, bases of 
operation and wider targets.  Whereas Gus Martin places Cuban groups (Omega 7), Jewish-Zionist groups 
(Jewish Defense League/JDL) and Irish ones (e.g. Provisional IRA/PIRA) who were based in the U.S. with al 
Qaeda as ‘international’.18   
Hewitt found that between 1954 and 2000, there were over 3,228 attacks and over 661 fatalities in the U.S. and 
Puerto Rico.19 According to Hewitt, during this period 31.2% of terrorist incidents and 51.6% of fatalities have 
been committed by ‘White Racist/Rightist’ perpetrators, including the Oklahoma City bombing. Following 
‘White Racist/Rightest’, are the ‘Revolutionary Left’ with 21.2% of incidents and 2.0% of fatalities, ‘Black 
Militants’ at 14.7% of incidents and 25.0% of fatalities, anti-abortion terrorists at 6.2% of incidents and 0.9% of 
fatalities, ‘Jewish Terrorists’ at 3.6% of incidents and 0.8% of fatalities, and ‘Other domestic/unknown’ at 2.8% 
incidents and 8.1% fatalities. Under ‘foreign’ terrorism, Hewitt has ‘Puerto Rican’ at 11.9% of incidents and 
4.3% of fatalities, ‘Cuban émigrés’ at 5.2% of incidents and 1.5 of fatalities, ‘Other foreign’ at 2.1% of incidents 
and 4.1% of fatalities, and ‘Islamic’ the lowest at 1.1% of incidents and 1.7% of fatalities.20  
Hewitt argues that there have been nine waves of American domestic terrorism. Each wave was constituted 
through and defined or represented by a particular and dominant political movement, cause, ideology and 
perpetrator profile which emerged and mobilized in response (as defense or opposition) to developments, 
conflicts and other circumstances in a given context (e.g. desegregation and civil rights, Vietnam, abortion law), 
although many overlapped in the volatile 1960s and 1970s. Each wave, associated movements and attacks went 
into decline or ended due to a number of factors, including counter-terrorism and other forms of state 
intervention (e.g. legislation, arrests and killings) which, according to Gurr and Ross, destroy terrorists’ 
‘coercive capabilities’. There is also movement dynamics (e.g. leadership battles and power struggles, splits and 
burnout) and public response (e.g. backlash) which affect their ‘political capabilities’,21 as well as changes to the 
context or social-political terrain that provided their raison d’etre and conditions for mobilization.    
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The first wave occurred between 1954 and 1969. It centred around white supremacist opposition to 
desegregation and civil rights in the South, and was dominated by the Ku Klux Klan and the National States 
Rights Party. During this period, which peaked in 1964, there were approximately 588 incidents, including 
bombings to shootings, assaults and intimidation, with sixty-five fatalities. The targets were largely black 
people, protestors, civil rights activists and places of worship.22 The most notorious cases included bombing of 
the Hebrew Benevolent Congregation Temple in Atlanta, Georgia on 12 October 1958, the assassination of 
NAACP field secretary Medgar Evers on 12 June, 1963, the 16th St. Baptist Church bombing in Birmingham, 
Alabama which killed four young black girls on September 15th, 1963 and the June 1964 murders of civil rights 
workers James Earl Chaney, Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwerner in Mississippi, the latter committed by 
Klansmen, who included amongst their ranks, law enforcement officials.23 Another group in the 1960s was the 
more oppositional Minutemen who made attempted to assassinate Arkansas Senator and Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee William Fulbright, poison the UN and bomb the Hollywood Bowl during a speech 
by Martin Luther King, Jr.24  
The second wave occurred in the mid-1960s and involved those labelled Black Separatists, such as the Nation of 
Islam, Death Angels and the Mau Mau, and Black Nationalists, such as the Black Panthers, George Jackson 
Brigade and Black Liberation Army.25 During this period, it is claimed there were approximately 475 incidents, 
72% of which were shootings, and 400 people killed or injured.26 In one of the biggest cases, the Black Panther 
Party was alleged to have been involved in a failed plot to bomb police stations, department stores and public 
buildings, as well as kill police officers in New York City in 1969. Thirteen members were brought to trial, but 
all were acquitted.27 
The third wave occurred in the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s and centred around groups identified as part of 
the Revolutionary Left, such as the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), New World Liberation Front, Students 
for a Democratic Society (SDS), United Freedom Front (UFF) and The Weather Underground. The latter were 
involved in bombing military and business targets, as well as robberies, shootings and kidnappings, with 
approximately 500 incidents,28 including the June 1974 bombing of the Gulf Oil Building in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania.29 In an example of different waves coming together, there was the May 19 Communist 
Organization (M19CO), including members of the BLA, Black Panthers, Republic of New Africa and Weather 
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Underground. They were involved in prison breaks, including that of Assata Shakur and FALN leader William 
Morales, and an October 1981 Brinks robbery.30 
The fourth wave involved the Puerto Rican independence movement from 1969 to the late 1970s, following an 
earlier period of activity in the 1950s. The movement was active in both Puerto Rico and the mainland United 
States. During the first incarnation, in 1954, independencistas attempted to assassinate President Truman in 
Washington DC and wounded five members of the House of Representatives in a gun attack on the House.31 
Groups included the Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), Macheteros and Armed Forces 
of Popular Resistance.32 FALN targeted banks, corporations and symbols of U.S. capitalism and imperialism, 
and the Machetertos targeted U.S. soldiers and police. There were approximately 365 incidents, including 
bombings, shootings, robberies and rocket attacks, and eighteen people died.33 In 1980, more than a dozen 
members of FALN members were convicted and imprisoned for terrorist related crimes.34 
The fifth wave involved Jewish Zionist groups, such as the JDL and splinter groups Jewish Armed Resistance, 
Thunder of Zion and Save Our Israel Soil. The JDL had been around since 1968 and was active into the 2000s, 
but the peak and period of this wave was between 1969 to 1989. The JDL bombed Soviet and Arab embassies 
and Arab-American organizations in and around New York City. There were 115 bombings, leaving five dead, 
as well as shootings and assaults.35 In an intersection of two terrorist threats, linked by intergroup and 
international conflicts, JDL leader Meir Kahane was assassinated by an Egyptian terrorist in New York in 
1990.36 
The sixth wave centred around anti-Castro Cuban émigrés and took place between 1968 and 1980.37 Groups 
included Omega 7 Cuban Nationalist Movement, Cuban National Liberation Front, Alpha 66, El Pondor 
Cubano.38 Many of which were supported, through training or funding, by the U.S. government and targets 
within the U.S. included Cuban exile community members, and there were 168 incidents and ten murders.39 
Omega 7 is said to have been responsible for 50 attacks on, the Venezuelan Consulate and Lincoln Center in 
New York, a Soviet ship in New Jersey and the Cuban Mission to the UN.40  
The seventh wave centred around anti-abortion terrorism, beginning following Roe vs. Wade in 1973 and 
experiencing revivals in the 1980s and 1990s.41  Perpetrators included groups that advocate or perpetuate 
violence such as the Missionaries of the Preborn, Pro-Life Action Network and the Army of God, websites such 
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as the Nuremburg Files and so-called ‘lone wolf’ terrorists such as James Kopp.42 Their tactics included murder, 
bombings, arson, acid and anthrax attacks, assault, intimidation and harassment. The first recorded incident was 
an arson attack on an Oregon clinic in March 1976.43 1984 saw a significant increase in attacks, with 25 
bombings and arson attacks, and was named the ‘Year of Fear and Pain’ by the Pro-Life Action Network,44 and 
1994 saw the highest number of murders (four) and attempted murders (eight) for any year.45 
The eighth wave was represented by a revival of the extreme-right in the 1970s-1990s, including white separatists, 
neo-Nazis, anti-government patriots and militias. The period (‘5th era’) was initiated by former Klansman Louis Beam 
Jr. with the call to arms ‘Where ballots fail, bullets will prevail’ and paramilitarization of the Klan.46 The most 
notorious groups were the Christian Identity affiliated Aryan Nations and The Order, the latter of which were 
responsibly for a wave of terror including the bombing of a synagogue in Boise, Idaho in March 1984,47 and murder 
of radio DJ Alan Berg in Denver Colorado on 18 June 1984. The 1990s saw government (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms/ATF and FBI) sieges at the Ruby Ridge, Idaho home of anti-government activist Randy Weaver in 
August 1992, that left his wife, son, dog and two marshals dead, and at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco Texas 
in February-April 1992, where 76 died. These informed Beam’s call for ‘Leaderless Resistance’ and emergence of the 
Militia movement.48 There were approximately 60 right-wing plots during the decade, which peaked with the 
Oklahoma City bombing,49 followed by the bombing of Centennial Park, Atlanta Olympics in 1996 by Eric Rudolph.   
Although not constitutive of a wave, other movements and groups emerged during these periods. The 1980s saw 
the emergence of eco and animal rights activism, such as the Evan Meecham Eco-Terrorist International 
Conspiracy, Animal Liberation Front, Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front, some of whom 
would continue into the 1990s.50  
The ninth and final wave involved Islamists, most notably al Qaeda. Within the United States, this wave began 
in the early to mid-1990s with the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, killing six and injuring 1042 (Hewitt 
19). There were also al Qaeda attacks on American targets and allies abroad, including U.S. embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania in August 1998, and the USSS Cole in Yemen in October 2000.51 These followed Osama bin 
Laden’s Declaration of Jihad against the U.S. and Saudi government, and bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 
endorsing a fatwah calling on Muslims to kill Americans anywhere in 1996 and bin Laden’s second in command 
Mohammed Atef’s endorsement of a fatwah calling for jihad against the U.S. ‘Ulema Union of Afghanistan’ 
internationally in May 1998.52  
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While the focus on and discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the U.S. starts in the 1950s and 1960s 
with domestic terrorism, international terrorism became a major concern for the United States following a series 
of events beginning in 1969 and continuing into the 1970s. America has the distinction of being the favoured 
target of international terrorism in the post-1960s ‘modern’ era of international terrorism.53 According to the 
State Department, there were 1,617 attacks on American targets abroad between 1970 and 1989.54 The most 
popular targets were diplomatic/political, military, corporate (financial, energy, chemical, communication, 
technology) and perpetrators included state-sponsored agents (e.g. Libya and Iran) and groups with a range of 
ideologies and causes, most notably Marxist (Red Army Faction), Islamist (Hezbollah), Palestinian Nationalist 
(Abu Nidal) and ‘ideological mercenaries’ (Japanese Red Army),55 as well as others. Like with domestic 
terrorism, international terrorism and the particular movements and perpetrators that emerged were informed by 
developments social-political context (e.g. foreign policy, military actions, etc.) and went into decline based on 
both changes to that context, as well as counter-terrorism, movement dynamics and public response. 
The first event that brought international terrorism to American attention was the 1969 TWA high jacking and 
hostage taking by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, quickly followed by the 1970 highjacking of 
a TWA flight from Frankfurt and a Pan American flight from Amsterdam, and then the murders of Israeli 
athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics.56 The 1969 TWA hijacking was also one of many in a peak year, and 
period. Between 1969 and 1972, almost half of all highjackings originated in the U.S., and in 1969, 37 out of 
82.57 The 1970s also saw a series of attacks on U/S. embassies and officials: Khartoum in 1973, Athens in 1974, 
Kuala Lumpur in 1975, Beirut in 1976 and Tehran in 1979.58 The 1970s also saw the emergence of foreign 
nationalist groups active in the United States. Examples include the assassination of Turkish consulate officials 
by the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia in Los Angeles in 1973.59 That same year, the PLO affiliated 
Black September killed an Israeli Air employee in Washington DC.60 In 1976, Otpor high jacked TWA Flight 
727 from New York to Paris in a campaign to gain Croatian independence from Yugoslavia. In 1978, they took 
over the West German Consulate in Chicago in an attempt to secure the release of a member held by the state in 
Cologne.61 The decade ended, and next stage in international terrorism (Rapoport’s fourth ‘religious’ wave) and 
counter-terrorism began with the 1979 the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranian 
Revolutionaries. They held the embassy and sixty hostages (although released some) for 444 days,62 in an 
attempt to have the U.S. hand over the Shah, who had been backed by the Americans and was in the country for 
medical treatment, for trial.  
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Despite the activities of the anti-abortion movement and extreme-right during the 1980s, the decade would see a 
decline in overall domestic terrorism compared with the 1970s, but an increase in international attacks,63 most 
notably by Arab and Muslim groups in the Middle East. Hezbollah was particularly active with attacks on U.S. 
bases and embassies, high jacking, hostage taking, kidnapping and murder during the 1980s. In April 1983, they 
launched an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut which killed forty-nine and injured 120. In October 1983, they 
attacked the U.S. Marine base and barracks in Beirut, killing 241, and later that year launched an attack on the 
U.S. Embassy in Kuwait.64 In September 1984, they bombed the U.S. Embassy Annex in East Berlin, and later 
that year, they kidnapped and murdered CIA station chief William Buckley in Beirut. This would be followed 
by further kidnappings and murders into the early 1990s, including that of Lieutenant Colonel William Richard 
Higgins USMC in 1991. In June 1985, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad hijacked TWA Flight 847 on route from 
Cairo to San Diego and, in October that year, the Palestinian Liberation Front hijacked the Achille Lauro and 
killed Leon Klinghoffer by throwing the Jewish-American wheelchair-bound pensioner overboard.65 In 1986, 
the La Belle nightclub in Berlin, which was frequented by American soldiers, was attacked by Libyan sponsored 
terrorists in retaliation for American military intervention in Libya. The attack killed three, including two 
servicemen.66 There was also the Libyan sponsored bombing of Pan Am 103 Lockerbie attack in 1988. It killed 
270 people, mostly Americans.67 In addition to this, there were examples of suspected state supported or 
perpetrated terrorism by Iran, most notably the 1989 pipe bomb attack on the car of the wife of Captain Will 
Rogers of the USS Vincennes, which shot down an Iranian plane the previous year (Alexander 19). The decade 
was not limited to Arab, Muslim or Middle East related terrorism. In 1985, the National Front bombed a 
nightclub in Greece injuring 69 Americans, and the car bombing of the U.S. Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany 
by the Red Army Faction and French Direct Action, killing two and injuring fifteen.68 There was also the 
attempted attack on an Air India plane in New York by Sikh terrorists and gun running in and through the 
United States by PIRA.69 
The 1990s saw an increase in international terrorism, attributed partially to the Gulf War and the emergence of 
al Qaeda. In 1990, there were thirty-two incidents and in 1991, between January and March, there were 104.70 
1991 also saw calls for Jihad against the U.S.,71 and 1993 saw a threat to assassinate President Bush during a trip 
to Kuwait.72 In terms of al Qaeda, there was the first WTC attack in 1993, the same year as an ambush of U.S. 
soldiers in Somalia. These were followed by the 13 November 1995 car bombing of the U.S. run Saudi National 
Guard training Centre in Riyadh and the 26 June 1996 attack on Khobar Tower, Saudi Arabia where coalition 
forces were based, killing nineteen, and for which Iran and Hezbollah were eventually held responsible.73 Then 
there were two bombings outside U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 
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1998, killing 234, including twelve Americans, and wounding thousands, and the 12 October 2000 attack on the 
USS Cole in Aden Harbour, Yemen, killing seventeen and wounding thirty-nine American soldiers.74 The 
period also saw attacks linked to Iraq and the Gulf War on U.S. embassies and consulates in Frankfurt, Berlin, 
Sydney, Dhaka, Mexico City, Istanbul and Kuala Lumpur, and on the U.S. military in Jeddah, Ankara and Izmir, 
U.S. businesses such as Ford, Coca-Cola and others.75 Despite all this, and particularly the 1993 World Trade 
Center attack, belief that this was a closed case and the activities of the anti-government movement led to a 
focus on domestic terrorism, compounded by Oklahoma City in 1995. This is alleged to have led to missed 
opportunities to pursue and consolidate information about al Qaeda,76 leading to the issue of counter-terrorism. 
Counter-Terrorism Pre-9/11 
Counter-terrorism serves a number of (sometimes overlapping) functions, including prevention, deterrence, 
control, retaliation, security, and symbolism, as well as addressing wider risks and consequences, and can be 
based on a number of competing and complimentary theories. It can address terrorist targets, such as security for 
political, military and private institutions, civil society populations and infrastructure, and target a wide variety 
of causal sources including political and socio-economic inequality, international conflict, ideology and 
psychology, or terrorist resources, such as financing, support, state sponsors and weapons. It can make use of a 
number of its own resources and powers to stop or limit terrorist capabilities, opportunities and impact, such as 
military, security, intelligence, diplomacy, foreign policy, foreign aid, peacekeeping, legislation, criminal law, 
police/law enforcement, emergency responders, international bodies, conventions and cooperation, and media. It 
can target perpetrators with everything from de-radicalization, repression, arrest, prosecution and sanctions to 
killing (during arrest attempts or as assassination) and military retaliation.77 It can be can be proactive or 
reactive, preventative or retaliatory, and responds to threats, events, political agendas, as well as mistakes and 
failures. The record of counter-terrorism programs and strategies is mixed. Not only in terms of failure to stop 
an attack, but in terms of its wider social and political implications. While it is intended to prevent, control or 
stop terrorism and save lives, it can also have a negative impact on ‘suspect communities’, civil liberties, human 
rights and democracy where counter-terrorism and security is placed above consideration of these issues, and 
used to justify repressive policies and tactics, as well as aggressive military actions.  
While the types and definition of terrorism, and what is included in the latter, can change as we have seen in the 
previous section, so does counter-terrorism. Alexander argues that while post-9/11 we have come to see 
terrorism as a national, federal issue and combatting it involving a relatively centralized, coherent approach, 
previously the U.S. did not see terrorism as a ‘major strategic challenge to the very survival of the Republic’ and 
‘spoke with a bewildering variety of voices on the definition of terrorism’.78 The tendency, according to 
Alexander, was to treat terrorism based on acts as individual incidents, ‘without political pattern or strategic 
dimension’.79 While generally true, there were exceptions, most notably the political use of the FBI through 
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their counterintelligence programme COINTELPRO in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to address a wide variety of 
so-called ‘subversives’, including the Ku Klux Klan and Black Panthers. The wider lack of consistency and 
coordination was the norm and partly a product of the lack of national centralized definition and approach.  
As stated earlier, it was not until the 1980s that the FBI, acting as a domestic federal law enforcement agency 
within the Department of Justice (DoJ), created clear official operating definition of terrorism.80 Other federal 
executive agencies developed their own definitions in line with their own mandates and jurisdictions, such as the 
CIA’s definition which focused on the international.81 This lack of a federal, centralized approach, was a 
product of and exacerbated by the fact that in the U.S., terrorism has historically been defined and dealt with by 
state and federal law enforcement as a criminal matter, and in the U.S. federal system, individual states have the 
power to determine what is an offense under its criminal code. As such it has been defined, pursued, or not 
pursued, and dealt with differently between and within different states,82 as well as differences in how 
coordination and cooperation with federal authorities works. State laws addressing terrorism have appeared 
under nine headings: civil defense (interstate compacts and state emergency management plans), anti-terrorism 
provisions, destructive devices, terrorist threats, enhanced criminal penalties, victim compensation, street 
terrorism, ecological terrorism and taxes.83  
Another factor in the lack of coordination has been the lack of major national domestic event, such as 9/11, to 
bring these together or apply pressure. One impact of this lack of national priority and coordinated approach, 
and multitude of voices, are gaps in fragmented intelligence and approach. Although, the lack of centralization 
and resulting unevenness while allowing excesses in some areas and jurisdictions, can help to mitigate against 
these nationally. On this point, a concerted, centralized national priority, as was the case following 9/11, is not 
an inherently positive or constructive thing as it led to the invasion of Iraq, which was not involved, and 
Guantanamo Bay, as well as surveillance and profiling that targeted Muslims and threatened wider rights, civil 
liberties and trust. The other impact of this lack of coordinated focus and strategy was a somewhat reactive 
approach in which strategy and policy are developed in response to threats and events as opposed to being done 
with a pro-active, wider, long-term view in mind. Something that a history of counter-terrorism can provide an 
illustration of and lesson for.  
While most histories of U.S. counter-terrorism begin in the late-1960s and 1970s with the emergence of 
international terrorism, or even later in the 1980s,84 the domestic U.S. story starts in the mid-1950s and 1960s 
with the Ku Klux Klan, but can be located earlier in 1860s and 1870s when the Klan first emerged. The Klan, 
which formed in Pulaski, Tennessee in 1865,85 was dissolved in 1871 following efforts by the federal 
government, whose reconstruction efforts were being challenged. In 1870 a federal grand jury labelled the Klan 
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a ‘terrorist organization’,86  leading to hundreds of indictments and, in 1871, Congress passed the Third 
Enforcement Act or Ku Klux Klan Act of 1987, which suspended habeas corpus in order to by-pass the Posse 
Comitatus Act and allowed President Ulysses S. Grant the power to send federal troops to suppress armed 
combinations, night riding, harassment and other Klan violence.87 This pattern would be repeated in response to 
the 3rd era Klan in the 1960s. In response to Klan opposition to the civil rights and violence, the FBI deployed 
its Internal Security Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which was created in 1956 to ‘neutralize’ an 
expanding list of subversives, starting with communists and moving to ‘White Hate Groups’, the ‘New’ or 
‘Revolutionary’ Left and ‘Black Extremist’ organizations.88 
Widely viewed as extremists and terrorists today, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Klan had been defending laws and 
institutions such as segregation and white supremacy, and opposing threats to these (desegregation, civil rights 
and voting rights), and not only supported local and state law enforcement and elected officials, but received 
support from them and included such figures amongst their ranks. While laws about racism were being changed, 
Klan violence and the inability to address it, was seen to present a barrier to the safe implementation and 
enforcement of desegregation, civil rights and later voting rights, much as it had to reconstruction. Three cases 
around the time of the Civil Rights Act, not only increased pressure to pass the act, but led the Federal 
Government to take action. These included the assassination of Medger Evers and 16th St. Baptist Church 
bombing and the murders of Schwerner, Clancy and Goodman.89 In 1964, under pressure from President 
Lyndon Johnson and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the FBI launched the COINTELPRO 'White Hate 
Groups' programme, targeting the Klan.90 In 1965, also under pressure from Johnson, the United States House of 
Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities conducted hearings into the 
Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the United States (1965-6), most notably 
terrorism, and produced the report The Present Day Ku Klux Klan Movement (1967), which declared the 
organization 'un-American'..91  
COINTELPRO would continue into the 1970s, but from 1969 the focus would turn from the white supremacist 
racist right to Black Power, with the FBI declaring the Black Panthers the most dangerous internal threat,92 as 
well as the revolutionary left. Within a year of the FBI’s announcement, all senior leaders of the Black Panthers 
would be on trial, in prison, on the run or dead and by 1972, Huey P. Newton would announce the end of their 
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‘militant self-defense program.93 In terms of the left, in his 1969 ‘Campus Unrest Speech’, President Nixon 
called student and anti-war demonstrations and occupations, as well as arson attacks by protestors, the ‘next to 
last step along the road to terrorism’.94 In 1970, Nixon and FBI head J. Edgar Hoover focused on what was 
termed ‘revolutionary terrorism’, allegedly being perpetrated by ‘determined professionals’.95 The government 
amended the Organized Crime Control Bill in order to label bombings of ‘buildings, vehicles, or other property 
of any federal assisted institution or organization’ a federal crime,96 and re-established the DoJ’s Internal 
Security Division and Special Litigation Section, which had not been active since the discredited McCarthy era 
and pursued conspiracy investigations.97 In June 1970, the Nixon administration extended intelligence activities 
through a presidential mandate, as opposed of attempting to pass new legislation that would require oversight 
and approval.98  On 25 June, the President established a special Interagency Committee on Intelligence, led by 
Hoover. Its Huston Plan justified the extension of state authority to acquire evidence (e.g. electronic 
surveillance, mail checks, ‘surreptitious’ entry, underage campus informants and military undercover agents), 
and a DoJ unit was created to coordinate law enforcement and save and process all info about terrorist 
bombings.99 Yet, between 1970 and 1972, The Pentagon Papers revealed the extent to which espionage by 
COINTELPRO, CIA and military was conducted on and gathered intelligence on Americans.100 In 1974, the 
United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities (Church Committee) investigated COINTELPRO and, in 1975, declared it illegal and 
unconstitutional.101 In addition to this, there has been relative consensus that COINTELPRO was politically 
motivated and undemocratic, used to suppress, criminalize and delegitimize political protest and speech.102  
COINTELPRO was an example of the government expanding the definition of terrorism (possible without an 
official definition) and using counter-terrorism discourses and tactics to deal with social movements and 
political protests, particularly progressive ones, that challenged the state using counter-terrorism discourse and 
tactics. But while COINTELPRO focused on organized movements who threatened or engaged in violence, 
such tactics were not limited to these. In response to so-called ‘race ‘riots’ in the 1960s and 70s, the government 
set up the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which put out the 1976 
Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism. The report referred to riots as ‘a tactic or technique by 
means of which a violent act or the threat thereof is used for the prime purpose of creating overwhelming fear 
for coercive purposes’,103 thereby linking more diffuse and constitutionally protected protest to organized 
terrorism and criminalizing it.   
                                                          
93 Ibid. pp. 198-199. 
94 de Graaf, p. 73. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid. p. 78. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid. p. 79. 
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid. p. 87.  
101 Ibid. 83.  
102 Alexander; de Graaf; Cunningham; C. Berlet and M. Lyons, ‘One Key to Litigating Against Government 
Prosecution of Dissidents: Understanding the Underlying Assumptions’, Police Misconduct and Civil Rights 
Law Report, Part 1: Vol. 5, # 13, January-February 1998, Part 2: Vol. 5, #14, March-April 1998; Cunningham; 
de Graaf. 
103 Alexander, p. 26. 
International terrorism became a major concern for the US beginning in 1969, with the 1969 TWA high jacking 
and hostage taking by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the 1970 TWA and Pan Am 
highjackings and Munich Olympics in 1972.104 These events led to the establishment of three bodies: 1. 
President Nixon established a cabinet level committee to coordinate counter-terrorism; 2. The State Department, 
Interagency Group on Terrorism; and 3. The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism.105 The State 
Department became the lead national agency for dealing with terrorism.106 In 1971, The Organization of 
American States, to which the U.S. is a member, became the first regional international organization to respond 
formally to terrorism, including kidnappings, with the 1971 Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of 
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International 
Significance.107 Following Munich, the U.S. put forward a draft UN Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Certain Acts if International Terrorism, leading to concerns from the developing or so-called 
‘Third’ World that this would be used to deny legitimacy to anti-colonial movements and national liberation 
struggles. This was reflected in the 1972 resolution.108 
In response to the number of highjackings, in 1972 Director of Aviation Security Lieutenant-General Benjamin 
Davis proposed legislation that when passed in 1973, made boarding gate security measures mandatory.109 That 
year, U.S. highjack attempts fell from 31 to three, and searches led to 3500 lbs of explosives, 2000 guns and 
23000 knives.110 Research by Enders, Sandler and Cauley in 1990, found that while metal detectors had a 
significant long term impact, there was a displacement effect onto other tactics, such as kidnapping and 
assassinations.111 Despite the success of metal detectors and international agreements for their introduction, over 
the years, we would cases such as Lockerbie in 1988 and 9/11, which showed that different points of origin have 
less safeguards in place, new security avoidance technology could be developed and U.S. airport security was 
not updated, if not also degraded. In 1976, there would also begin an attempt to fortify US Embassies which, 
while reducing attacks, also had a displacement effect, with an increase in assassinations.112 In addition to 
security, the U.S. would sign agreements with other countries, such as the Memorandum of Understanding with 
Cuba that would provide for the return of hijacked aircrafts and extradition of prosecution of perpetrators.113  
There were also pieces of anti-terror legislation passed by Congress during the 1970s, including the 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Section 303), which focused on state 
supported terrorism which had become a central issue, calling for cutting off of U.S. support for ‘any 
government which aids or abets terrorism, by providing sanctuary from prosecution, to any group or individual 
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which has committed an act of international terrorism’.114 In October 1977, Chairman of the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, Senator Abraham Ribicoff, introduced the bill: An Act to Combat International 
Terrorism. Amongst other issues, its definition of terrorism linked it to the international context, crimes under 
existing international conventions, states and international organizations as targets, and exempted military 
operations from being labelled terrorism.115 Following from the focus on state supported terrorism in the 1976 
Act, in 1979, Congress developed a black list of countries supporting terrorism, including Libya, Iraq, Syria, 
South Yemen and, added later as developments in the international arena occurred, Afghanistan, Cuba, North 
Korea, Sudan and Iran.116 The 1979 Iranian hostage crisis highlighted the lack of a coherent American policy. 
While admirable for not using force, President Carter blocked Iranian assets, sought UN sanctions and used the 
International Court of Justice, without success, then launched a failed rescue mission in April 1980, Operation 
Eagle Claw, and aborted second mission, Operation Credible Sport, and then returned to negotiations. This 
failure eventually led to the creation of U.S. Special Operations Command and, with other attacks on embassies, 
a focus on embassy and personnel security.117 It also played a pivotal role in the 1980 election campaign where 
Carter was defeated by Ronald Reagan and in the more aggressive militaristic in tone, rhetoric and policy of the 
Reagan era. The fact that the hostages were released the day of Reagan’s inauguration, led to him getting credit 
over Carter’s negotiations was indicative of this shift. 1979 did though see the introduction of the International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.118  
The 1980s saw a continuing focus on international terrorism and the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy and 
Marine Base in Beirut let to the formation of two new commissions and the development of a new approach to 
combatting international terrorism. The first was the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Long Commission, which 
called for the replacement of the reactive approach to terrorism, in favour of a proactive one, and for treating 
international terrorism as a form of warfare.119 The DoD defined international terrorism as ‘unlawful use or 
threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization …. Considered criminal under local law or 
acts which violate the law of Armed Conflict’, and the Beirut attack as being ‘tantamount to an act of war using 
the medium of terrorism’.120 This link was reasserted in June 1984 when U.S. representative to the UN, 
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick stated that ‘[t]errorism is a form of war against a society and all who embody 
it’.121 This link to war made international terrorism a top security concern for America, and set the stage for its 
eventual consolidation of the war discourse and approach in the post-9/11 war on terror.  
In terms of security, this was the focus of the second post-Beirut development. CIA Director Bobby Inman was 
appointed to head a new commission focused on security for U.S. embassies, bases and personnel abroad. This 
included structural improvements to increase security at facilities and personnel protection, as well as the 
appointment of an Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism within the DoD to oversee this.122 This was also 
                                                          
114 Alexander, p. 26.   
115 Ibid. p. 14.  
116 Ibid. p. 26.  
117 Wilcox, p. 44 and 52. 
118 Crenshaw 1989, p. 63.  
119 Alexander, p. 27. 
120 Ibid. p. 12. 
121 Ibid. p. 12.  
122 Ibid. p. 27.  
partly in response to a series of kidnappings Americans by Hezbollah. This development also led to elements in 
the National Security Council to embark on Iran-Contra, bringing the administration and efforts into 
disrepute.123 Support for the right-wing rebel Contras in Nicaragua as well as UNITA in Angola in the 1980s,124 
while labelling left wing groups and governments ‘terrorists’, also led to charges of American hypocrisy on the 
issue of terrorism. Another case that demonstrated American inconsistency, if not selectiveness, in its response 
to terrorism, was the 1984 case of PIRA member Joe Docherty who the U.S. refused to extradite to Britain 
following a court decision. It led to a 1985 Extradition Treaty, passed in 1986 when Reagan, in response to U.K. 
support for the bombing of Libya that year.125 
In response to terrorist attacks and international-focused counter-terrorism mandate, the period also saw a 
number of other developments, including the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and 
Terrorism, Anti-terrorism Act of 1984, which would see aspects of its proposed definition of terrorism in the 
1986 FBI definition discussed earlier.126 The year also saw a series of specific acts: The Act of Rewards for 
Information Concerning Terrorist Acts (98th Congress, 2nd Session, HR 5612) and 1984 Act to Combat 
International Terrorism (98-533), which established a counterterrorism rewards programme, administered by the 
Diplomatic Security Service,127 as well as the Prohibition Against the Training and Support of Terrorist 
Organizations Act of 1984.128  
Despite the linking of international terrorism to war, Congress had a narrower focus in relation to specific 
crimes: Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Crimes Against Aviation and Crimes Against Taking 
of Hostages.129 In addition to this and the fact that the 1977 An Act to Combat International Terrorism exempted 
military operations from being labelled terrorism, authorization for military operations were not sought as the 
challenge was still identified officially as a criminal and not military matter.130 This gap between rhetoric and 
policy would continue throughout the decade, and the rhetoric would become increasingly dramatic as the cold 
war stepped up.  
On 4 February 1985, Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz stated that ‘[t]errorism poses a direct threat not 
only to Western strategic interests but to the very moral principles that undergird Western democratic 
society’.131 He claimed that the ‘enemies of the West are united’ and called for democracies to be ‘united in a 
common defence against terrorism’, similar to George W. Bush’s post-9/11 call for a coalition of the willing in 
the war on terror. Yet, the U.S. still had not developed a unified official definition for the term ‘terrorism’ in 
relation to conflict.132 It was only, as stated earlier, in 2001 that the State Department came up with a definition 
of terrorism in U.S. Code title 22, section 2656f(d)).133  
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Following the 1985 hijackings of TWA and the Achille Lauro, Reagan made his now famous statement that 
‘America will never make concessions to terrorists’,134 and established the U.S. Cabinet Task Force on 
Combatting Terrorism, appointing Vice President Bush as Chair. In its December 1985 report, it recommended 
greater coordination of agencies, a role on the National Security Council and the establishment of a consolidated 
intelligence center,135 and establishment if the Directorate of Central Intelligence (DCI) Counterterrorist Center 
(CTC) bringing together different tasks spread out throughout the CIA and intelligence community, as well as 
operations officers, analysts , reports officers, technical experts and other specialists in a ‘one-stop’ shop.136 In 
their February 1986 report, they set out U.S. policy on negotiating with terrorists, contrasting clearly with that of 
the Carter administration’s attempts in Iran and affirming Reagan’s speech, ‘The United States has a clear policy 
of no concessions to terrorists as the best way to protect the greatest number of people’.137 They also concluded 
that ‘judicious employment of military force’, might serve as an effective deterrent, but warned of the 
implications of ‘gunboat diplomacy’.138 The criminal approach was reasserted with the Omnibus Diplomatic 
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which made it a federal crime for terrorists to threaten, detain, seize 
injure or kill an American citizen outside the U.S. borders. This allowed American law enforcement authorities 
to conduct investigations outside the U.S. and led to legal attaches being stationed in U.S. embassies.139 There 
was also increased funding, over $2.4 billion, for embassy security in 1986, but research has shown that this had 
no deterrent effect.140 At the same time, military retaliation was also used, most notably the U.S. bombings of 
Tripoli and Benghazi ‘Operation El Dorado Canyon’ following the 1986 Berlin Disco bombing linked to Libya, 
which killed 37, including Muammar Gaddafi’s adopted daughter.141 According to Enders, Sandler and Cauley, 
military retaliation in the form of El Dorado Canyon, while popular with Americans, it led to negative responses 
from the international community, including allies, and was not a significant deterrent, leading to a short-term 
increase in terrorism targeting the US and some of its allies.142 Military retaliation was only used two more 
times prior to 9/11, in response to the assassination attempt on President Bush in 1993 and attacks on U.S. 
embassies in Africa in 1998.143 The 1988 Lockerbie case, which ended the decade, while in Scottish, as opposed 
to U.S. jurisdiction, led to American sanctions and Federal Aviation Administration work to improve security.144  
 
While the focus of counter-terrorism in the 1980s was primarily on international terrorism, there were 
developments domestically, mostly focused on the extreme-right and centred around Christian Identity affiliated 
groups such as Aryan Nations and The Order. In addition to charges against The Order for their crimes, in April 
1987, a federal grand jury in Fort Smith, Arkansas, brought seditious conspiracy charges against senior leaders 
of Aryan Nations and ten surviving members of The Order. The charges included conspiracy to overthrow the 
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federal government, assassinate an FBI agent and a federal judge, bomb federal buildings, utility pipelines, and 
electrical transmission lines, poison water supplies, and sabotage railroads. Yet, in April 1988, the accused were 
acquitted of all charges.145 
 
Despite the focus on international terrorism in the 1980s under Reagan, and terrorist threats and attacks 
occurring the wake of the Gulf War, including the first WTC attack and threat against Bush in 1993, which led 
to cruise missile strikes against Iraqi intelligence agencies in Baghdad,146 initially the Clinton administration did 
not see terrorism as a major national security issue, nor part of foreign policy planning.147 According to David 
Tucker, former Foreign Service officer, U.S. policy on terrorism was in a ‘strategic vacuum’ post-Reagan and 
post-cold war.148 Clinton inherited an existing counter-terrorism policy based on four principles: 1. No 
concessions to terrorist demands; 2. Imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions against state sponsors; 3. 
Enforcement of rule of law to bring terrorists to trial; 4. Multilateral cooperation.149 For Reagan, it had been 
central to the cold war and to Bush, the post-war ‘clash of civilizations’, but Clinton did not have a coherent 
focused framework for international terrorism, however flawed and ideological these were.150 According to 
Martha Crenshaw, the Clinton administration rejected the ‘clash of civilizations’ approach and saw terrorism as 
part of a grouping of ‘modern’ global problems, including organized crime, disease epidemics and 
environmental disasters as a feature of the globalized world.151 Domestic terrorism did become an increasing 
focus though, albeit inconsistently.152 This was primarily in response to right-wing anti-abortion and anti-
government groups, with 60 right-wing plots and major events such as the Oklahoma City bombing during the 
decade. There were also 60 actual attacks by the right and wider movements, killing 182 and injuring over 1932. 
Yet, this was actually the continuation of a long-term decline overall that began in the 1980s, attributed to the 
FBI working with other law enforcement agencies, including the discredited COINTELPRO, more prosecutions 
and a loss of revolutionary fervour seen in the 1960s and 1970s.153  
The first major piece of legislation passed under Clinton was the Freedom of Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 
which prosecuted any protest that impeded clinic access, to deal with harassment and threatening behaviour, as 
well as protect the legal right to abortion.154 That same year, the Attorney General Janet Reno established the 
Task Force on Violence Against Abortion Providers to investigate whether there was a conspiracy to commit 
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acts of violence against abortion and reproductive health providers.155 At the same time, the extreme-right, and 
more specifically anti-government, activism and threats had been on the rise, but the response was mixed. In 
response, in 1995, the SPLC’s Morris Dees issued a warning letter to Attorney General Janet Reno urging her to 
‘alert all federal law enforcement authorities to the growing danger posed by the unauthorized militias that have 
sprung up in at least eighteen states’.156 Only nine days prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, Kenneth Stern, 
former director of the National Organization against Terrorism and representative of the American Jewish 
Committee, issued the report Militias: A Growing Danger.157 Yet, there was no response. It is likely that the 
experience of Ruby Ridge and Waco, and their role in the mobilization of the anti-government movement, led to 
greater caution or fear on the part of federal authorities.   
The Oklahoma City bombing was not only on an anniversary of the American Revolution, but that of the final 
day of the Waco siege. In fact, McVeigh referred to his attack as a ‘retaliatory strike’ for Ruby Ridge and Waco, 
and targeted a federal building housing the ATF. The response to the bombing included the establishment of an 
FBI counter-terrorism taskforce in the Pacific Northwest,158 and five Senate sub-committee hearings held 
between May and November 1995. The hearings included: Combating Domestic Terrorism, The Militia 
Movement in the United States, The Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America, The 
Federal Raid on Ruby Ridge, ID. and The Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch 
Davidians.159 The latter two of which represented an acknowledgement of the link between the two sieges and 
anti-government activism and terrorism.  
In response to Oklahoma City, and delayed response to the 1993 WTC attack, Clinton issue Presidential 
Decision Directive (PDD) 39 U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, which came into force in June 1995 and focused 
on both domestic and international terrorism. PDD 39 made ‘terrorism a top national security priority’, 
designated terrorist attacks both a criminal act and a national security threat, and justified the use of force.160 It 
also made the FBI the lead government agency for terrorism investigation and prevention and led to the 
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establishment of the FBI Counter-Terrorism Centre, which focused on three areas: domestic terrorism, 
international terrorism, and countermeasures.161 The FBI would also see their counter-terrorism budget increase 
from 78 to 609 million and a staff increase of 224%, from 550 in 1993 and 1669 in 2000.162 PDD 39 also made 
FEMA the lead authority for consequence management and create the Domestic Emergency Support Team 
(DEST).163  
The Oklahoma City bombing also provided Congress with the impetus to pass the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, a version of which had been proposed following the 1993 WTC attack, but was 
opposed on grounds that it could pose a threat to civil liberties and negatively impact Arab and Irish 
communities.164 The 1996 Act earmarked one billion for federal counter-terrorism and new initiatives would be 
introduced, such as chemical tagging of explosive material, a crackdown on financing, streamlining of execution 
and removal procedures for foreign terrorists, procedures to make it easier to withhold aid to countries that 
support terrorism, an increase in penalties for conspiracy, allowing victims to sue state sponsors of terrorism, 
and expanding the use of funds from the Victims of Crime Act for victims of terrorism.165  
At the same time as the Oklahoma bombing, in 1995 Clinton and the U.S. Attorneys established local task 
forces to coordinate law enforcement efforts to deal with abortion clinic violence.166 Following the October 
1998 murder of Dr Bernard Slepian, Attorney General Reno established the National Task Force on Violence 
Against Health Care Providers, which would issue their Report on Federal Efforts to Prevent and Prosecute 
Clinic Violence 1998-2000 at the end of the decade.167 
Other developments at this time included the more internationally focused Executive Order 1015 in 1996, which 
established a Commission on Aviation Safety and Security led by Vice President Al Gore. In its 1997 report, the 
Commission warned of threats to air travel, including Operation Bojinka. a failed plot to bomb 12 American 
flights.168 There was also the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996: Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY97, which provided for training of first 
responders in WMD incidents, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program. This was followed 
by a joint report on crisis management submitted to congress by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
and FBI.169 1996 also saw the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and the Helms-Burton Act (focusing on Cuba), 
requiring the U.S. to sanction foreign companies that engage with these countries.170 
Following the al Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, Clinton launched 
cruise missile attacks at a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, which was believed to be producing nerve gas, and 
sanctions against Sudan, as well as attacking bin Laden’s base in Afghanistan. The attack on Sudan and 
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particularly on an unsubstantiated target that destroyed medical supplies, led to a backlash against the U.S.171 
They also indicted bin Laden and Mohammed Alef in absentia,172 tightened economic and diplomatic sanctions 
on Afghanistan and placed pressure on Pakistan to end its support for the Taliban.173 In addition to this, there 
was also a renewed focus on embassy security.174 1998 also saw PDD 62 and the establishment of the Office of 
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator 
was placed within the National Security Council, reporting to the President through the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, and dealt with infrastructure, counterterrorism, WMDs, preparedness 
and consequence management.175 
In 1999, there was fear of both millenarian movements and millennial violence and al Qaeda. Fear of the former, 
and memories of Ruby Ridge, Waco and Oklahoma, led to the FBI’s Project Megiddo. Its report, released in 
1999, analysed the potential for extremist activity by white supremacists, militias, Christian Identity, Black 
Hebrew Israelites, apocalyptic cults and others around the millennium, and warned law enforcement.176 Yet, 
none of the predicted threats or attacks occurred. Fear of al Qaeda led to extra security measures, including the 
FBI suspending all tours of its headquarters in Washington DC, the closure of selected diplomatic posts, and 
sanctions against the Taliban.177 A 1999 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction recommended a shift from threat assessment and prevention 
to response and combatting terrorism, and the creation of an Office for Combatting Terrorism be created, with 
increased training for response (Alexander 31). 
In preparation for the challenges of the next century, in 1999, the Twenty-first Century Commission led by 
former Senators Warren B Rudman and Gary Hart was established. In their 2000 report, they predicted a 
nuclear, chemical and/or biological WMD attack in the next 25 years and called for the creation of a cabinet 
level agency to take responsibility for defending the United States against attack. They also recommended that 
the National Guard be changed to form a ‘Homeland Security Agency’ with U.S. based troops.178 1999 also saw 
the formation of the National Commission on Terrorism. It was chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer, who 
would later go on to be posted in post-invasion Iraq. The Commission issued the report ‘Countering the 
Changing Threat of International Terrorism’ in 2000. It argued that international terrorism posed a dangerous 
and complex threat and that the U.S. needs to make greater effort to counter it, and, in an assertion of the 
proactive-preventative model, put prevention (including intelligence gathering) as the first priority, but called 
for the U.S. to prepare for a WMD attack. It also called for states that support terrorism to be targeted, private 
sources of financial and logistical support to be subjected to U.S. and international law, and the President and 
Congress to review, reform and fund counter-terrorism in order to ensure that all programmes and activities are 
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part of a comprehensive plan.179 In 2000, the U.S. Government Interagency of Domestic Terrorism Concept of 
Operations Plan (CONPLAN) was formed to coordinate federal, state and local agencies in response to WMD 
threats.180  
The October 2000 al Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in Yemen led to the end of using the Suez Canal and the 
state department issuing warnings to U.S. civilians from traveling in certain regions, a high alert in the Middle 
East and the end of joint exercises with Jordan in Bahrain.181 Despite this and calls for greater coordination, the 
14 December 1999 arrest of Ahmed Ressam of Algerian Armed Islamic Group who was found with explosives 
in his car allegedly for a New year’s attack on LAX while crossing the border at Washington State, FAA 
warnings about highjackers in July 2001, FBI concern about flight school students and the arrest of Zacarias 
Moussaoui arrested in Minnesota in August 2001, and CIA reports to the FBI about al Qaeda members in the 
U.S.,182 America was not prepared for 9/11. These failures were raised in media reports and 9/11 commission 
hearings The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.  
This brings the history of U.S. counter-terrorism to the end of the pre-9/11 period. In addition to showing that, 
far from a clear and consistent historical narrative and strategy as the history of counter-terrorism is that of 
responses and reactions, changes and adaptations, different political interests and initiatives, selective 
applications, caution and overreach, successes and failures, cut off dates are problematic. For Singh, 9/11 not 
only represented an end of innocence and heralded in an unprecedented chapter, but ‘confirmed the many prior 
warnings that the question of mainland terror was one of when, not whether, it would occur’.183 So as much as 
9/11 appears to have changed the terms of discussion, debate and policy, it was a paradigm shift that was 
produced by a failure to recognize the signs of a threat that led up to the event that ‘changed everything’, as well 
as some selective forgetting of the past. Hopefully this overview can aid in our understanding and analysis of 
counter-terrorism past, present and future, highlight the continuities and discontinuities, contextualize it and 
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